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FROM : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DATE:

SUBJECT: Meeting of the COAS/OC June 28, 1963 to Hear Report
of Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson on the
REF : Cuban Situation.

Following are the principal points re Cuban developments made by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson at closed meeting of COAS/CC June 28, 1963:

1. U. S. Policy toward Cuba

The best statement of present U. S. policy toward Cuba was that of Assistant Secretary Martin before Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees on May 22:

"...It is not coexistence. We want to get rid of Castro and Communist influence in Cuba. It is not passive. We are engaged in a variety of measures, unilateral, bilateral and multilateral, which are designed to increase the isolation of Castro; to increase his serious economic difficulties; to prevent by military means, if necessary, any export of aggression from Cuba; to thwart Cuban-based and supported subversion of Latin American governments; to increase the costs to the Soviets of their maintenance of Castro; to persuade the Soviets that they are backing a losing and expensive horse; to effect the withdrawal of Soviet military forces in Cuba; and to maintain surveillance of Cuba to ensure that it does not again become a military threat to the United States or its allies in this Hemisphere."

2. Soviet

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Comments and Classification Approved by:
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Clerical

G - Mr. Johnson

2. Soviet Military Presence in Cuba

The U. S. does not consider Soviet military presence in Cuba a military threat, particularly in absence amphibious capability. However, an indefinite Soviet presence is undesirable and the U. S. is making this clear to Soviets. No change in U. S. position on this.

Over 5,000 Soviet military persons have left Cuba since mid February. An estimated 12,000 to 13,000 remain. The U. S. does not know to what extent this outflow will continue, however, a slowing down of withdrawals detected. Castro and the Soviets maintain that Soviet military not troops but only technicians. Castro insists they must remain until peace is restored.

Soviet military continues control advance weapons systems, but Cubans are being trained in MIG-21's and KOMAR class boats. U. S. has less concrete information regarding SAM's (surface-to-air missile sites), but it is not believed Cubans are being trained to operate them. Cubans now occupying some facilities formerly exclusively occupied by Soviet military. Difficult to say how many Soviet military are left in these facilities.

A few military cargoes have arrived since the missile withdrawal but no affect on Cuba's military posture. Cargoes have not contained large nor important weapons systems, however, appears include more high speed torpedo boats.

3. Soviet Cuban Relations Following Castro's Visit to the USSR

The Castro visit to USSR revitalized the Soviet-Cuban alliance and "papered over" Castro and Khrushchev rift after Cuban crisis. Khrushchev achieved important success in getting Castro's endorsement principal Soviet points (e.g. co-existence) on its differences with China. This contrasted with Castro's ambivalent position before USSR trip. However, this does not mean necessarily that Castro will follow slavishly Soviet line. He still may pursue an independent line, particularly in Latin America.

A second major result of trip was the strengthening of party ties. The emerging United Party of the Socialist Revolution received extensive public recognition as an equal among bloc parties. Castro frequently referred to in his role as First Secretary of that Party rather than as Prime Minister. This

emphasis

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emphasis on establishing dominance of party as opposed to any individual indicates the importance party apparatus so that if future developments should dictate situation, with Communist control of Party, Castro could be dispensed with, without loss of Communist control of Cuba.

The third principal point in regard Castro's trip was subordinate role of Cuba within the bloc's economic division of labor scheme. Communique contained only one concrete economic concession, USSR would increase price it would pay for sugar from 4¢ to 6¢ per pound, this being at time when world sugar prices approximately double. Thus is Soviet policy, apparently accepted by Castro to retain Cuba in supporting role of agricultural supplier. Upon his return to Havana, Castro played down industrialization idea and emphasized importance of increased sugar output.

At this point Mr. Johnson recalled Castro's attacks on the U. S. for keeping Cuba a dependent supplier to the United States of the agricultural product, sugar. What Castro did was simply to shift from supplying the U. S. to supplying the USSR with sugar.

Cuba got relatively little out of Castro's trip. This emphasizes the subservient role that Castro is playing within the Soviet empire. Though Castro himself was personally showered with attention, other than the increase in sugar price Castro accomplished little. Soviet public commitments to Cuba did not go beyond those previously made by Khrushchev, though they seek to imply more.

4. Cuban Internal Situation

After Castro's return he took an apologetic stance regarding the shortcomings of Cuban economy. Cuban economy is still declining. The 1963 sugar harvest was 3.8 million tons, the lowest since 1945. The standard of living in Cuba is still dropping, and transportation system is breaking down because of lack of spare parts and because Soviet-supplied spare parts are causing much trouble. Indications of low workers' morale; low output and absenteeism. In June 5 interview Castro contrasted the economic chaos in Cuba with Soviet economic organization and high productivity. Worker control and other repressive measures designed to increase output in Cuba may be intensified as a result of the Castro visit. This will bring about further worker dissatisfaction.

While there

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While there many weaknesses in Castro Government, security apparatus is very efficient. Castro still has the support of elements in Cuba that have benefited from his rise to power. Internal armed resistance is small scale, uncoordinated and not seriously threatening the regime.

5. Castro's Subversive Efforts in the Hemisphere

Although Cuban radio appeals for revolutionary action have dropped off during the past few months, Cuban connected subversion efforts have increased in past year. The U. S. feels that steps to counter this are progressing. Police and military force capabilities are improving. The U. S. has been helping in such ways as it can. Travel to Cuba is a significant remaining problem. Efforts to control this have been made more difficult because Cuban willingness to spend considerable sums in this field. There also need for reducing transfers of funds designed to support Castro's efforts in the Hemisphere.

Much remains to be done to counter Castro's subversive efforts in the Hemisphere. As we develop new measures they devise new ways to overcome them. We must be constantly alert and remain one step ahead.

6. In response question from Argentine Representative, Mr. Johnson stated U. S. does not have in mind at present time proposing additional public action against Cuba by COAS/OC. We will, of course, consult OARs at such time as we think further action on hemispheric basis might be useful. U. S. is continuing to press forward through diplomatic channels with measures isolate Cuba, particularly in economic field. Through cooperation European allies, trade with Cuba substantially reduced and considerable success in reducing volume free world shipping, virtually eliminating traffic by established lines. Despite this, number of ships calling Cuban ports has increased. They owned mainly by small operators attracted by high charter rates. U. S. now considering what additional effective measures could be taken reach this type shipping.

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